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INTERVIEWEE: Brigadier General (Retired) Robert G. Heitshu

INTERVIEWER: J.R. Digger MacDougall

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Transcription of Interview Number 31D 4 HEITSHU**Brigadier General (Retired) Robert G. Heitshu****Interviewed 21 October 2003****By J.R. Digger MacDougall**

Canadian War Museum Oral History Program Interview with General Bob Heitshu, recorded on the 21st of October 2003 in Ottawa, Ontario. Interviewed by J.R. Digger MacDougall. Tape 1, Side 1.

HEITSHU: My name is Robert George Heitshu.

INTERVIEWER: Thank you very much for joining us. What I'd like you to do is just start off by giving us an overview of your entire military history--just bring us up to when you retired, from when you joined.

HEITSHU: Well, it starts fairly early, because where I went to high school in Quebec City, the Cadet Corps was mandatory for all students. But at the same time, the war was going on and the Air Cadet League was created and I was also a member of the Air Cadets on weeknights—the Army Cadet activities taking place in the daytime. I attended Number 9 Bombing and Gunnery School, in Mont Joli, in 1943 and 1944, as an Air Cadet. And that's where I had my first ride in an airplane, which was an Anson—I forget what mark it was. But it was quite fascinating. I, of course, was building model airplanes at the time, so I always have that as a memory.

However, as time went on, I graduated from the high school and had joined the militia—13 Field Regiment in Quebec City—Artillery--and had applied to go to RMC. Well, RMC didn't reopen until 1948, so it was recommended that I go to university. So, I went to St. Francis Xavier University in Antigonish, Nova Scotia, and joined COTC as a gunner cadet in 1948, and then proceeded for three summers to go to Shiloh, Manitoba and Picton, Ontario, for training. In 1951, when NATO was formed and Canada was going to send troops to Europe, I transferred from the militia to the regular force. My first posting was with the 79 Field Regiment in Shilo, and we proceeded to Germany in December of 1951, where I served in Hohne, until 1953.

While I was there, I always sought out the Air OP unit that was stationed near our base, and catch as many rides as I could. So, eventually when we returned to Canada, and I was not selected to go to Korea with the regiment, because I had married while I was in Germany, I applied for the Air OP course. And, lo and behold, I was selected and sent to Crumlin Air Force Base--RCAF Crumlin in London -- for the aircrew selection. What I remember is, amongst other things, was having to sit on a bench with my back to the wall—right on the wall—to see if my feet were long enough to touch the pedals. For my height, remarkably enough, my feet were such that I was able to qualify, although later on I used to wear a cushion behind me when I flew the Auster in Rivers.

I was posted from Rivers, upon graduation, to 1 Air OP Flight, in Camp Petawawa, which was a unit of 1 Canadian Division, commanded by General Rockingham at the time, and spent three wonderful years there with the Flight. Then I was posted away from flying duties for a number of years. But eventually, after Staff College, while I was in Edmonton as the G2 Nuclear, I received a phone call that they wanted me to proceed to Fort Rucker, Alabama, for an Army Aviation Staff Officer's course and then to return to Petawawa to command 1 Air OP Troop, as it was then called, and was part of 4 RCHA. Fortunately, or unfortunately, I did not remain with the troop very long, because the CO wanted a Major to command an airborne or air transportable battery to join the first NATO Allied Mobile Force. So, I left the troop, and then was heavily involved with the RCAF in creating, or at least establishing, air loading tables for Hercules to move this mortar battery that I was commanding, to Norway and a lot of things that related to, I think, a certain knowledge about air matters.

After commanding the battery, I was moved to Winnipeg where unification had just taken place, and Western command actually was absorbed into Training command. I became the Army Personnel wallah for the west part of the country. And, unbeknownst to me, I was positioned there because the following year, I was promoted to take command of 3 RCHA which, of course, had an Air OP troop integral to its organization. That tour was cut short slightly because it was decided that we should have a program in the Forces where French Canadians would be trained in their own language. And they were going to create second schools throughout the country, which was a bit too idealistic, so that they decided on a program called Francotrain, which I was put in charge of and posted to Quebec City, so that I would be promoted. The whole program came to slow down to the point that I didn't want to remain there too long, so they sent me to the National Defence College.

From there, I was posted to Gagetown, and promoted to full Colonel to be the so-called Base Commander. Although at this time, the base had become the Combat Training Centre, so I was doing the former base duties, whilst another officer was commanding the Combat Training Centre. From there, I was promoted to Brigadier General to command 5 Combat Group in Valcartier, in 1973. At that time, the Order of Battle of 5 Combat Group included 430 Helicopter Squadron, before it was moved to 10 TAG but remained physically in Valcartier. I didn't object to this. On the other hand, the fact that a unit is not under command can present problems in the sense that someone else can move it around. Being a gunner, these terms—'under command', 'in direct support' and 'in support'—mean quite a bit. The nuances are quite important.

After 5 Combat Group, I was posted, after three years, to Ottawa, to become the Director General of Postings and Careers, Other Ranks. I was there quite a while—for four years. That was a most interesting job because Other Ranks Careers had their own directorate, which somehow gave more credence to the Other Ranks and the way they were, not treated, but careered, I suppose. And after four years, I was posted as the Secretary of the Staff at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe in Mons, Belgium, and I was there for three years, and then posted back to Canada, just in time for my retirement in 1983. So that pretty well is the summary of my military career.

INTERVIEWER: Thank you very much. What year did you enroll again, in the regular force?

HEITSHU: In the regular force? In June, 1951.

INTERVIEWER: June of 1951. And you had already had some experience through Air Cadets with flying. How did you actually go through selection for a pilot?

HEITSHU: Well, to begin with, the Career Manager of the Gunners decided that we needed to continue to train pilots for the Air OP. And, it was merely what process they went through; I'm not sure, other than I was qualified with my exams. So, I went to London, Ontario where I took the Standard Aircrew medical, which apparently was no different than if you were joining the Air Force. And then, when the results came out that I had passed the medical, I was posted to Brandon, Manitoba—posted really to Rivers, Manitoba—the military base, but actually living in Brandon, and attending flying training at the Brandon Flying Club. That course began on the 11th of January 1955. And then, we moved from there to Rivers, in April of the same year, and graduated in July of that year, as well.

INTERVIEWER: And what aircraft did you fly there during that time?

HEITSHU: Cessna 140s were the planes we flew in Brandon, and then, when we got to Rivers, they were equipped, then, with the L-19. But because one of the Air OP Flights—the one in Shilo—still had Austers, I was also trained in Austers, in case I was posted to Shilo. They were the only two aircraft that we were qualified in, at the time when I took my course.

INTERVIEWER: How would you describe your training as a pilot?

HEITSHU: Well, it was very exciting, because as I said earlier, I always aspired to fly an airplane, although it was always in the context of my being an artilleryman. In other words, an airplane would enable me to see more of what was going on, and do various things, which we were developing. The course at Brandon was a little bit of a shocker because I had just come from a very regimental organization, with all the trappings and trimmings, and there I was shoveling snow, in case no one arrived, and being treated pretty well as—well, differently.

INTERVIEWER: As an Officer Cadet?

HEITSHU: An Officer Cadet—exactly! Although the person who ran it—ex Wing Commander Ed McGill, who became an MPP in Manitoba—was a very understanding person and I thought a very good leader of men—appreciated what we were going through and the pilots—our instructors were either ex-Air Force or a bush pilots, and were quite interesting. Mind you, it was very, very cold. This was January, and once we soloed, every flight we had to go up at about six thousand feet and do a spin to the right and a spin to the left, which I suppose they don't do any more. But by the time you pulled out, the engine had cooled down quite a bit. Our clothing was adequate though. But being in the Prairies, it was always nice and sunny, and very interesting.

In Rivers, I enjoyed the ground school in Brandon and thought that sort of added breadth to the whole thing. In Rivers, it became a bit more competitive, in the sense that people were beginning to sort of rate your ability as a pilot. I always had a bit of trouble in the landing—not so much the landing part, but turning in too soon. But these things were rectified. I failed my first night country flight, because what I thought was a village of, I don't know, say, Nipawan, was actually a prairie fire! When I got there, there was no town. So they said,

“Maybe you should have checked with something else.” Anyway, but it was an interesting time. We were still living in Brandon, so we had to commute, but we had a car pool.

Three of the students, along with me, we stayed on the Brandon Airport in the old “dental” building, of the war station. Lorne Rodenbush and Bill Venue lived across the street, in one of the old barracks. And the memorable part about the Rivers period, of course, was the long cross-country trip to Banff Springs, and that was a bit of a holiday. Harry Reid was our mentor on that trip. I remember landing in Saskatoon in very high winds, where actually you felt more like a helicopter, especially with that sixty degrees of flap on the L-19. Our graduation was always a highlight. General Rogers, of certain fame--was Prairie Command at the time--was a great canoeist and an adventurer--gave us our wings.

INTERVIEWER: When was that, that you got your wings?

HEITSHU: In July of 1955.

INTERVIEWER: So, you flew the L-19, the Auster—any other type--and the Cessna 140...

HEITSHU: The Cessna 140. And then, of course, our continuation flying. Well, first of all, when I was commanding the 1 Air OP troop in Petawawa, we were equipped with one Cessna L-19-L, as we called it—a 182, really, which was great for liaison work. We evacuated a few people to the NDMC from Petawawa, on occasion.

INTERVIEWER: Did that have skis or floats?

HEITSHU: It had skis, and eventually, it had floats, but I was gone by then. And then, our continuation flying—I flew Fleet Canucks, Cessna 170s, Cessna 180s, Beech Musketeer (that’s what I was trying to think of), Piper Cub—that’s about it, you know.

INTERVIEWER: So, you had an opportunity to fly a lot of civilian aircraft. How would you describe the handling characteristics of the aircraft that you flew when you were, let’s say, working inside the AOP, either as a pilot or commanding.

HEITSHU: Well, I thought the L-19 was a very good aircraft, for the role that we were involved in, and in fact, was built for that role, basically. The visibility was great. Of course, we had a rather powerful engine—unlike only 215 horsepower, I think. But with the fixed pitch prop, as soon as you were airborne, you would throttle back about two thirds of the way, so when you were doing low flying or tactical flying in the days of tactics, you’d have lots of power available. The sixty degrees of flap was a great boon for landing in the short fields, and for short takeoffs. Initially, we had a mechanical flap, and then it was replaced by an electrical flap, and I remember, at the time, being a bit concerned and saying, “That’s another thing to go wrong.” We had developed the capability of lowering the flap as required on short landings, and then, trying to sort of conceal ourselves on concealed approaches. Whilst with the electric flap, you felt you weren’t as much in control, but you overcame that problem, I guess.

It was also very good, in the sense that the communications were excellent. One of the things I had mentioned earlier was that what I enjoyed about Air OP was more than just flying an airplane. It was, as gunners, I wanted to tell you, a good source of intelligence. I became the

unit Photo Officer, when I was in 1 Air OP Flight. Together with General J.V. Allard, who commanded 3 Brigade, we came up with what may not be completely unique, but a way of taking a series of low obliques of enemy positions or objectives that we were planning to attack, and then superimposing on them, an arbitrary grid, when we enlarged the picture, so that a person who held that picture could refer to it in clear, and tell us exactly what he wanted us to observe or to engage ultimately.

INTERVIEWER: Where did you get your training in aircraft photography?

HEITSHU: Well, really we didn't get--most of it was created at the flight. We had a good rapport with the "Whitehouse" as they call it—the photo establishment in Rockcliffe. And we borrowed K-20 cameras on packing note, which was the Air Force way of doing things, which was good. We also liaised with a Flight Lieutenant Abbess, in the photo shop, who helped us design a photo wagon, in which we put a Williams multi printer and worked quite hard at, for about six months. And when we took that to the field, we could go on a mission and take about twenty five photographs, of various locations, return back, have them developed, printed and dropped over the western headquarters in a sandbag—all within about an hour and a half. Which, to come back to this whole idea, was quite fascinating because a lot of young platoon commanders don't have much time to do any reconnaissance, and this gave them a clear picture of where they were supposed to go, and it became a very popular. We were overwhelmed after a while, but it was very interesting.

INTERVIEWER: How were you treated differently as Commander of an AOP troop, say, than a Regimental Officer, if that occurred?

HEITSHU: Actually, we were very fortunate in 1 Air OP Flight because it was a div unit—we were meshed with Headquarters 1 Canadian Division. Being gunners, as well as being a pilot, you were often involved in briefings or in communications with senior officers, about things that at your rank, you wouldn't be made aware of elsewhere. I suppose being a pilot, you were treated a little bit more informally, because invariably, a lot of these senior officers would want a ride in your airplane, or take them somewhere. But basically, it was pleasant, because you felt that you were more in the picture of what was going on. There was no resentment. Of course, when the flying pay went up considerably, there was the odd comment about that we were all rich, but that goes with the territory, I suppose.

INTERVIEWER: What was your history in flying pay, when you started in flight training, when you were a young officer, and as you went through the Forces?

HEITSHU: Yes, basically, flying pay was the same as the jump pay—it was \$30 a month. And I think you saw about \$23 of that. That, from 1955 until I went to Staff College in 1963, where it had gone up considerably—it went up to \$125 for a Captain, and \$150 for a Major. When I left, that was the rate at the time.

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned that you had flown both the Auster and the L-19. What were the differences that you encountered in the performance of those two aircraft?

HEITSHU: Well, basically, I found that the Auster was underpowered compared to the L-19. However, it was just as capable of landing in short fields. But taking off in short fields was certainly easier with the L-19. The visibility was not as good as in the L-19—partly maybe

because of my height, I felt that in the L-19, you were sitting in the aircraft, as opposed to the Auster where you are more or less—you were straight out, as opposed to your knees being bent, you know. So I found that I got more all round visibility from the L-19 than the Auster. Really, I never flew an Auster on skis, so I don't know what differences there would have been. But basically, most of my flying and gunner related activities were with the L-19.

INTERVIEWER: Would you describe the AOP--perhaps, for the benefit of the transcriber, say what AOP means--and then, describe the unit, its vehicles, its equipment, personnel, that sort of thing?

HEITSHU: Well, the Air OP flights were designed to follow close to the troops they were supporting, and had the capability of being moved, obviously by air, or by land. The unit was equipped with vehicles that were large enough to actually house, after the wings were removed, the aircraft, and to move it from A to B. It had sufficient vehicles to allow ground reconnaissances to be made, to advanced landing grounds. It had sufficient wireless equipment and strong enough equipment to be in contact with the headquarters that we were supporting. And, the aircraft were equipped with radios that could communicate with the land forces, which sounds simple, but at one stage of the game, a lot of aircraft could not communicate with the ground troops because of different radios. We also had the capability, as I mentioned earlier, of taking pictures, so we had, within the unit, a photo equipment truck.

The people who looked after the aircraft—the fitters and riggers and mechanics—were all RCAF—Air Force personnel. The drivers, the cooks, the clerks, the signalers—were all Artillery. The officers were all Artillery officers, although during the War, the Adjutant was an Air Force person. When I joined the AOP, he was an Artillery officer. So the unit consisted of five aircraft, six pilots, and a number of vehicles—I forget the exact number—the troop would come to about sixty people. In some cases—in Gagetown, or on manoeuvres—for safety reason, the Air Force would allot a fire truck to the unit. But that was more of a peacetime measure, which really, when you think of it, wasn't all that helpful, because if you were going to prang in the wheels of this, that truck would never get there. That's the equipment and the personnel.

INTERVIEWER: How did command and control work, let's say for the Air OP, and then later, when you were in a command position?

HEITSHU: Well, to begin with, the main role of Air OP, of course, was to provide artillery observation, where other observations could not be done. So, it was basically an artillery arm. And initially, that was its prime mission, so that when the divisional artillery was engaged in a mission, the AOP could supply the observation. Subsequently, when we lost our division, and the Air OP flights became troops and went to the Regiments, they belonged to the Regiment. Now, whether a Regiment needed a complete troop is debatable, because it would have been expensive a bit on manpower, and not always required. ...

Now, with the advent of unification, it slowly became apparent that training of pilots may well be better done within the Air element of the newly created Canadian Forces, and ultimately, this is what happened. The Air OP troops were disbanded. The Artillery officers, who were flying in those troops, were given the offer of becoming Airmen in the Air element, or to return back to their unit. Many of them stayed on, because the pay was better and by this time, they had been away from mainstream Artillery, and that was a help in that they

were able to assist in the training of the future pilots. And also, to man the newly formed helicopter squadrons, which included an Air OP element in them.

When I was commanding 5 Brigade, I found this helpful because the former gunners, who I knew personally, were in the squadrons. As Commander of the brigade, the squadron was also part of my establishment. However, when they were regrouped into a Tactical Air Group, I lost a certain control. However, they remained in situ, and the liaison was very good, and I'm sure is, to this day. However, ultimately, these gunner trained Air OP flyers left—retired—and it's my personal opinion that properly trained airmen can engage the guns very well, and some of them have a flare for it and actually enjoy it. But I feel that not coming from the gunner family, they have a bit more difficulty in identifying with the needs of not only the Artillery, but of the Land Forces, who they know of, not by having been in them, but being briefed on. It's a very subjective point of view, but I think that, in fact, if you look at it historically, a lot of the airmen, helicopter pilots, including those who achieved high rank, recall—like to talk about their “army days”, if I can use that expression, because the type of flying there, was certainly more allied to ground forces and to, sort of one-on-one activities, as opposed to flying a transport aircraft or a fighter jet.

INTERVIEWER: I'd like to go back to command and control. But before I do, you mentioned that the type of flying was different. How did it differ than from what they would have done elsewhere?

HEITSHU: The helicopter?

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

HEITSHU: Well, because they were tasked, quite often—well, most of the time—by Army units. They attended Army Orders Groups where they became familiar with the way the Army runs. And in many cases, were more often in contact with...

INTERVIEWER: General Bob, in tasking, how would orders come down from brigade, let's say, to an Air OP pilot?

HEITSHU: Well, actually, the Commander of the supporting helicopter squadron would have attended the Brigade Commander's Orders Group. From that, he would have determined that there would be a need, at one stage, to provide artillery observation, and it would be up to him to deploy the required type of aircraft and trained pilot to do so. So that the Brigade Commander would not be talking directly to the person who would be involved in the tasking, which is not unusual. However, one of the things that sort of disappeared over time, if I can remember it correctly, is that the Air OP—the helicopter squadron—consisted of transport helicopters like the Huey and light helicopters—recce helicopters, if you will, like the Jet Ranger. So that there wasn't officially an Air OP section in the squadron, or officially an armoured recce unit—it was just the use of using light helicopters as opposed to transport helicopters.

So, one of the things that might not occur, as it did in the old days, is that there wasn't one pilot who might have had a special relationship with the Regiment, who on most occasions would be used, so he would know the personalities involved. He might even be sent to talk to one of the Battery Commanders, or the Regimental Commander as to how he envisions the

fire plan being carried out, and would also have a better feel of what was required. Another experience I went through was in Norway and in Newfoundland, where—this isn't sour grapes--we're all in the field following the battle by the minute, so to speak, while often the squadron, because of logistical reasons are away from the area, and actually only rejoined the war when required.

So really, it's a question of, not so much trust, but of mutual awareness of each other's requirements and how we can face them. And, of course, at the end of the day, resources are always short, and the owner gets first crack. This applies to any organization, so that, from my point of view, in terms of the total battle, is that unless you've got this close support, in whichever way it's achieved, then you're not being fully effective.

INTERVIEWER: Close support of the Air OP was what it was really founded upon?

HEITSHU: That's right.

INTERVIEWER: What was the function of the pilot when he was airborne?

HEITSHU: Well, to begin with, when a pilot was airborne, and this is another thing that gunners do usually when they are not airborne, is that usually--first of all we rely on communications—we can have all the guns we want, but if we can't talk to them... And of course, up until not so long ago, wireless communications were not as advanced as they are now, so that the pilot when he's airborne—first of all, has the ability to probably talk to more people because of his height, to be able to act as a relay station, to be able to sort of (garbled). At the same time, because of this position, he can observe things that may not be of immediate interest, but are simply part of the intelligence-gathering picture. So he has a certain wider range than just, for example—locating is a big factor in the Artillery—so, if he sees a flash somewhere--in fact, that's a whole field.

I graduated from the one-year locating course. This is a bit of an aside, but we were on this course. Locating is an art, which was actually—a science, if you will—created by General McNaughton in World War I, when he went up in a balloon and was able to observe enemy guns so that he could develop sound ranging, flash spotting, radar detection of the mortar trajectories. And one of the things on the course that struck me, is that I was on continuation flying in Shilo in the winter and when I flew over the ranges, when I looked down and saw where the shells had landed, I kicked up the dirt and the snow that had formed a fan shaped image a hundred and eighty degrees from where the shell came from. So, I convinced the instructor to go on—trailer analysis is one aspect of the course, and this was a way of being able to—so that, if you saw a bunch of fan shaped things behind you in your position, do a one-eighty and there may be guns there somewhere. So, it was an interesting aspect of it.

So, even within the Artillery, I found that having been a pilot was, well, a third dimension, if you can use the expression. And, to this day, Air OP pilots meet and feel that they had a rewarding career, but a different one.

INTERVIEWER: Describe some of the procedures that you would do, let's say for tactics within a unit, laying out a unit--what would happen when you got your orders?

HEITSHU: Well, for example, if the division or the brigade--depending on what unit you

were with, or supporting--was in an area, where it was decided to move forward over a certain distance, to make contact with the enemy -- an advance a contact, for example -- the Flight Commander, or the Air OP would have attended the Divisional, the CRA—the Commander Royal Artillery -- Divisional O Group and told that they were moving. Then he would return to the unit, and the immediate reserve pilot, who was usually the second senior in the flight, would then select from the map, an advance landing ground in an area that would enable the aircraft to support the operation.

He would then, from the map reconnaissance as well as an air reconnaissance, if time permitted or if the weather permitted or if the early activity was such, he would do that. And then subsequently, whether he did it or not, he would follow up by a land reconnaissance of the area, and he would go prepared to remain at this advance position. And he would use his jeep, followed by the troop sergeant with his jeep and wireless, who would also be remaining with him and be preparing the position, when the troops were called forward. So, upon reaching the proposed advance landing ground, he would examine it for security, in terms of visibility from any points around.

He would also make sure—well, to begin with, an absolute must, is to make sure that it can accommodate the type of aircraft we were flying. In which case, he would look at the direction of the field; it's proximity to cover for the vehicles and the aircraft themselves when they were on the ground, and the smoothness of the field. And this was determined partly by experience--partly by driving a jeep at a fairly high rate of knots. If it didn't do too much bouncing—the L-19 being able to bounce more than a jeep—he would declare it as suitable. And then he would, on the wireless, tell the Flight Commander that he had found an ALG and that he would be ready to accept the aircraft in such and such a time. So, the aircraft would fly in.

Now, in some places—like in Germany, during the war, in some of our exercises -- if the weather was really bad, then the aircraft would have to be—not disassembled, but the wings taken off—and then moved up in a truck. And then it would be the normal Artillery deployment—the airplanes, as opposed to guns. Then if, for example, the advance took place on two routes--we'll say one brigade to the right and one brigade left--then one of our pilots would be assigned, or our troop because it's a divisional troop, would be assigned in direct support--usually in direct support—not under command, because the brigades didn't have the facility of administering an ALG that was a distance away.

They would, either by wireless, or if they had the time, had gone to the respective regiments who were supporting that brigade, and come up with a list of codes or ways and means to provide the support. Which, as I say, would be more than just engaging opportunity targets, but of reporting back the progress. And, in fact, in many cases, a third pilot would be in direct contact with division or brigade: passing back this information; taking pictures if required; many times, carrying liaison officers, either to flanking units or to allow the Commander in many cases, to go up and see for himself what was going on. So, as I say, we oversaw the scenario.

INTERVIEWER: Your role was quite important then, for a number of reasons, let's say, certainly within the Artillery regiment, and later within the brigade. Were there any other duties that pilots were assigned to, within the AOP, outside of, let's say, operational duties?

HEITSHU: Well, we had the normal sort of Regimental duties. For example, we always made sure that we had ongoing training for the troops about aircraft recognition, for example. We trained our people, especially when we were in areas where we could be pounced upon by enemy aircraft. We trained observers, as we called them. In fact, at one stage of the game, we gave them half a wing to wear on their battle dress. And they sat in the back of the L-19, facing aft, and were quite good at, not only identifying possible targets or possibly seeing an enemy and identifying if they were, but also, acquired a sort of a bit of airmanship in the sense that they knew how to handle the radio.

INTERVIEWER: Interview with General Bob Heitshu. End of Side 1.

INTERVIEWER: Canadian War Museum Oral History Program Interview with General Bob Heitshu. Tape 1, Side 2.

INTERVIEWER: We were talking about the duties of pilots outside of flying operations, and you provided quite a good picture of that. How would you describe the relationship of pilots, let's say, within the unit, when you started to get pilots who were not artillery pilots per se?

HEITSHU: Well, in my case, the only time that I experienced that, is when I was commanding 5 Brigade, and before that witnessing it in, I guess, Gaagetown, when the squadron was posted there, is that there was quite a learning curve involved here. Because just as Artillery pilots after unification joined the Air element; by the same token, a lot of Air Force pilots found themselves in an Army element, if you will, and in some cases, some of them might not—I'm not sure if they wanted to be there. But that's a very subjective comment. But basically, once they arrived at the unit, and they were told what the various tasks were to be, I think they found it quite challenging.

Of course, in those days, there was a lot of—they shared the same mess, lived on base with the units, and very quickly, became conscious of each other's backgrounds. They were there to sort of make this thing work. And on the whole, as I said earlier, it did work, except for some people. It took time--in some cases where courses weren't available immediately, so that the unit sometimes was short of the required people with the proper training. But over time, this was handled very well. Right now, I can't tell you, because I've been away from it for quite a while.

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned earlier that a lot of the fitters and aircraft trades' personnel were RCAF. Were you involved in the transition to RCEME personnel, or did RCEME personnel ever get involved?

HEITSHU: Yes, I was. In 4 RHCA Air OP troop, when I commanded, the RCEME--the chief NCO for the maintenance of the aircraft was a RCEME Warrant Officer. But we still had some airmen, but they were being replaced gradually. Although I found it very painless—not that it should be painful, but it just happened. Of course, unification was well on its way then, so that it seemed to be different personalities, but the capability remained the same. One thing I did find, is that when we did have airmen in the troops, they were very proud to join the parades, where everybody was in khaki, and they were in blue. So they stood out, if only for that reason. They were very—a lot of them were taken by the esprit de corps in an Air OP troop. They came from bases where they weren't as closely

associated with the operations, and a lot of these airmen, of course, would fly with us, and we got to know them as always the same person--whereas on a base, they might have been a different person each time.

INTERVIEWER: One of the areas that all military personnel are involved in is continuous training. How was continuous training conducted for pilots, let's say, of your vintage—continuation flying, and that sort of thing?

HEITSHU: Well, continuation flying was, I think, a very good idea. First of all, as you said, it kept us current in not necessarily the type of airplanes we were flying before, but on changes in procedures and air traffic--well, airmanship in general. I must admit, it was also--at this time, we were making over a hundred dollars a month flying pay--lucrative, which was a concern in those days. And it was exciting, because a lot of us moved around quite a bit, so your continuation flying took place from Edmonton to Three Rivers to Gagetown—wherever you happened to be—so that you saw another part of the country. You met interesting people, because you were always flying in aircraft from a flying club. The locals were (well?) represented, because the pilots there were from all walks of life. And of course, the airplanes were different in each place. So I thought it was a very good program.

The only difficulty with it is that you had to do a certain amount of night flying, and a certain amount of cross-country. It was mandatory in one sense, but it was never really supervised. No one looked at your logbook, or checked whether you did your night flying or not. But I think most of us realized it was important, and we did it. But it wasn't always easy, if you were in a place--and you had to do this, always, in a quarter of a year--so that if the weather was bad, or if you went on an exercise and you couldn't be available, then it was a bit sticky. But most of us managed to get the hours in, if only because we wanted the pay.

And also, it was interesting because we'd often take colleagues up and give them an idea of what it's like low flying, which, by the way, we could do in those days more readily than now, because certain areas were reserved for that. So, I thought it was a good program, and most people, I think, would agree with me.

INTERVIEWER: What was the procedure that you went through? Let's say, you were in an operational flying unit, and you flew your own aircraft. So, how did you go from flying your own aircraft to flying somebody else's? Did you have to go through any sort of extra training?

HEITSHU: No. What you did, for example, when I went from—well, if you left a flying unit, wherever you went, you'd contact the local flying club. You'd say who you were. They knew about this continuation flying, because in those days, of course, a lot of the flying clubs were run by ex-World War II pilots, and they knew about the contract. They'd ask you what kind of airplane you'd flown, and if they didn't have that type on board--and often, we wanted to fly other kinds, so they'd give you a check ride. Most aircraft we flew were easy to handle. And it was as simple as that. And then they would sign our logbook at the end of each quarter, and you'd submit your claim to the local paymaster.

INTERVIEWER: How many hours did you have to fly a quarter, at that time?

HEITSHU: Good question.

INTERVIEWER: Twenty-five?

HEITSHU: Yes. Continuation flying was, I believe, twenty five or thirty hours a quarter—four of which had to be night flying.

INTERVIEWER: How did your knowledge of flying benefit you when you were in positions which did not require, let's say, a flying position type of situation?

HEITSHU: Well, when I took over command of 5 Combat Group in Valcartier, I was very fortunate in arriving there, just as the government had spent over, I forget how many millions, to refurbish the whole of the base Valcartier with a new hospital, and new barracks. They had extended the ranges because this was going to be the home of the French speaking only brigade, in the Forces. Up until then, and it was only three years before had there been a Combat Group there. So before that, it was a summer camp area, mainly used by the militia in the summer or the Vandoos, who were really in Quebec City, but would go there for field exercises. So there was a lot of things to be looked after, in terms of the size and the complexity of different types of units all sort of operating in a very confined area.

As an example, one of the things that I picked up unfortunately through a tragic day when a militia vehicle turned over and twenty-one young militiamen were wounded and what have you. No, it wasn't that. It was a grenade going off in a tent on the area, and we had to evacuate them to this new hospital. Well, the first thing I realized is there was no helicopter pad at the hospital, so all this was done in two and a half ton trucks which was really a messy, messy thing.

So, it struck me that, you know, a simple thing like having a brand new modern hospital and no helipad and no provisions for snow clearing or to indicate that a helicopter could land there was my first experience of "thinking air", so to speak. And then, of course, a lot of people there--the formations were fairly new. People looked at airplanes as truly airplanes—that they'd fly from A to B--they'd carry people. But it took them a while to integrate or to feel that you could use these things, so that it took me a long time to convince some COs to use an aircraft to do a preliminary range recce, if they're planning an exercise. If they needed to liaise with a headquarters somewhere, we have aircraft there for that purpose. And to also make sure that every time I had an Orders Group of any kind, that I would always include, in the Orders paragraph, for example, the air paragraph—air defense; passive or active.

I always used to be upset when people on exercise would be shooting at friendly aircraft, because any aircraft is a bandit--this sort of thing. It's hard to pin it down to any one specific thing, but that general knowledge, even within the Artillery, we'd have people who would say, "Well, all you guys do is fly." And until they went up and saw what we were doing—even though they should have known--they didn't have the feel for it. So, I felt that flying training was a big plus. And it helped also, in this case, being Army obviously, and having worked with the Air Force a lot, to help sort of smooth over the odd sort of glitches that would occur sometimes, too, in the Squadron.

INTERVIEWER: So, did you actually set up a flying training program for your COs, let's say, when you were in the brigade—that you had them go out?

HEITSHU: Well, not an official program. But for example, I made sure that the Artillery regiment was allotted sufficient ammunition to include exercising the airmen. I made sure that I never exercised—that the squadron was made aware that they may be required or not, and even if they weren't, to assist, so that this rapport could be brought forward. So, generally speaking, what I tried to do was--and of course, the airport was on the base, but a little distance from the center of gravity, so to speak. And what I did do in Valcartier—not just from the Air side of it—is that when I had my weekly O Group—but every month I'd have that O Group at a different locale. I'd have it right at the helicopter squadron, because some people had never been down to the airport—didn't even know it was there. I'd have it on the ski hills, some days, to show them that we had a ski hill. So, in that way, I was just trying to make this brigade more cohesive, which was more than just the flying aspect of it.

INTERVIEWER: Would you describe now what tactics you used? Were did the tactics come from? How were they developed, and how did you actually learn to fly an aircraft for the Artillery?

HEITSHU: Well, actually, the tactics of Air OP, I suppose, date back to World War I, where in fact the then fledging Air Force were not only involved in dog fighting, but in taking aerial photographs, of observing enemy troop movements, and locating guns. But then, after the war, this was all sort of forgotten. Basically, the Air OP as we know it was really started by demand from General Montgomery in North Africa for someone to observe from the air what Mr. Rommel was doing. And then, when the Canadian Forces decided to have their own Air OP units, they had a few people who had been trained by the British in North Africa, and who became the instructors, and actually were using the tactics that had been developed in the desert, and subsequently in Italy, which consisted mainly of being able to observe the enemy. And because they were light aircraft, they'd be far enough away not to be hit by anti aircraft fire. Or to be visible for so short a period, that it was difficult to (handle them?). And this continued throughout the war.

These same people who taught us at Rivers were practicing the same tactics. And of course it's interesting that it took a while until Korea came about to change this because the land is flat in Shilo, as you know, in Europe. But the stories related by POTs who flew in Korea were completely different because there, with the mountainous country, you had to fly reasonably high to observe enemy gun positions or movements. Secondly, the enemy—the North Koreans—had very little air, so you didn't have to worry about enemy fighters. So, basically there, the tactics were completely reversed. You flew as high as you could because you were trying to get away from light anti aircraft fire.

I remember Peter Chase telling the story of someone who said, "What are you doing at that height?" "It's because I can't get any higher!" Which in World War II would have been completely the reverse. And the truth of the matter is that the only person that was shot down, Joe Liston, was hit by, I think it was a forty-millimeter, because he wasn't quite high enough. So that really, I think, like any tactics, often is developed as the emergency arises, if you know what I mean. So, that's the way we looked at it, plus the fact that there was always this story that the Germans were always reluctant to shoot at Air OP because we reported where the shot came from and they would be engaged by Artillery. So, it wasn't carte blanche to mosey around, but it still was the approach that was taken at that time.

INTERVIEWER: Now you mentioned two things—flying high enough to not get shot at, and flying low enough not to get seen. What was that all about?

HEITSHU: Well, to begin with, there was another third dimension in that we used to have what they called in the Artillery, ‘shelling and activity connecting graphs’. In other words, if you were engaging a target with, let’s say, medium artillery, the trajectory was high and it’d be more howitzer like--more parabolic than a flat trajectory weapon. So that, in many cases, what you had to do is fly behind your own gun line or fly low in front, knowing that you were below the trajectory, and which took a little bit of... We had these profile maps and in a static situation, this could be achieved. But in a mobile battle, it would be pretty chancy. So what you’d try to do is, basically, sit behind the guns or at least not so far forward as you might get in the way of the trajectory.

But again, as I said earlier, the other aspect, too, is that in Korea—again, I wasn’t there—but the fact is that not only was this flying high a luxury because of no enemy air, there was our own air which because they had complete freedom of the skies, and a small aircraft was something that wasn’t going to detract them, there were some close calls about mid-air collisions. And in fact, when Joe Liston got shot down, a warning had gone out that there was an air strike in the area, and he was trying to get away from our own aircraft, going into the area where he was at. And it’s in the process of getting out of that area, whether he went too low, or what, but he got hit.

INTERVIEWER: Did you ever have any close calls when you were flying?

HEITSHU: Interestingly enough, I’ve had two close calls. One of them is flying up in Gagetown in the evening--very still air going up the Lawfield Road, and ahead of me a few miles, a CF-86 had crossed the road. I saw him and it was no problem. But he had created an invisible turbulence, and when I flew over that road, and I was only about thirty feet, my left wing just dropped. But mind you it came up. So, that’s one of the things that we passed on that summer is that the wake of jet aircraft in certain conditions could be dangerous.

I did have, once, a mid-air collision but I was formation flying which was just a bad (?). No, but even so, in Gagetown, at one stage of the game, the Navy used their Banshees as the enemy people, and Chatham had their F-86s and on a few occasions, we would land and let them sort it out, because--mind you, that was more from a safety point of view. But, yes, they got the hang of it after a while and they would attack us, so to speak, and we would like to take evasive measures, but that was no more than active low flying.

INTERVIEWER: Now in my recollection, any time I think of Air OP, I think of low level flying. What was that like?

HEITSHU: Well, it was great, actually. And I think that would differentiate it [from] boring holes in the sky, as we used to say, for the thrill of flying. Because obviously even though you’re only going a hundred plus miles per hour, it feels like a heck of a lot more. It takes a certain skill, I would think. And also we found, that in many cases, it was a good way to get information, because people wouldn’t hear you coming and wouldn’t see you coming. And lo and behold, you’d come across a field where everybody was uncamouflaged. So that gave you a hint and then you’d sort of come back. And theoretically, if there were other aircraft in

the area, they were bound to be higher, and once again you were harder to spot. Sometimes, communications might be upset by it.

You see, at one stage of the game and this is an interesting point, but when we got the L-19—it happened in more ways than one in the Forces--which came with an aircraft radio, which was VHF, and we were supporting—ground forces at the time were all equipped with HF radio. So, in fact, you couldn't talk. The role of Air OP couldn't be practiced with the equipment that was in the L-19. Now, the British had a 62 set which is a lighter version of the 19 set, but still, a bulky affair. And, it used to fit in the Auster, because the British had designed this thing to complement what the Auster required.

So, the first thing that Major Dave Francis, who was commanding 1 Air OP Flight in Petawawa, when he received the first L-19, is they got hold of a 62 set and went down to Rockcliffe, and liaised, to say, "How do you get a 62 set (which is the size of a, not an orange crate, but pretty big) into a L-19?" And finally, they came up with a system where it went behind the pilot's seat, with a separate mike and headset that linked to that set.

So, what was difficult to get used to was that when you went flying, you were talking back to base or to Air Traffic Control or what have you, on your VHF--normal set of the L-19. And then, when you were given a mission to go and support the guns, what you had to do when you were flying low is turn around, and with your right hand, find the little holes in the knob, and turn it, and you almost had to tune the wireless set to the regimental frequency. And having another put another pair of headsets and the left hand holding the mike, so occasionally, it was a bit sort of 'dicey,' I guess, is the word. And, of course, reception wasn't always that good. So that's why we used to try and at least establish communications on the ground, if possible, and then once that was done, then we would conduct the shoot from there.

But that was a real handicap. And then, however, when the new sets came in, then we were able to talk directly. And of course, it gave less room in the back for passengers and then, of course, what happens in these cases—we started putting more things in the plane and the C of G moved back. It was a good thing when it ended.

INTERVIEWER: One of the things you mentioned was the observer flying in the back seat looking aft. How were observers acquired, trained?

HEITSHU: Well, basically, subsequently I think there was an official course designed for—an observer course, it was called. But basically, in our Flight, it was an ad hoc course. We said there was nobody in the back seat, and it would be a good idea, especially after exercises where you were pounced on by so-called enemy bandits, to have somebody to look out for us. Also, we found that on section exercises—I remember one time in Algonquin Park in the winter, I took off and did a recce and moved just my section to another lake. So, the person I took with me was able to help me out when we landed on the lake, and what have you. So that they became a second hand in the sense of confirming—using the map as well, confirming what the ice looked like, being able to use the radio if you were busy doing something else, and also, as an answer to their desire to fly in an airplane. They were part of the team, and then, as I say, eventually, I gather my successors made a course out of this—you know, aircraft recognition being one thing, and radio handling, the next.

INTERVIEWER: So, before you got observers, then, were your unit pilots always flying by themselves?

HEITSHU: By themselves. And in fact, the British system, as I recall, was the only one that did that. In the American Forces, to my knowledge—in fact, I’m sure of it (garbled) Rucker (garbled) -- the Artillery observer was not the pilot, and it was our opinion that that was not as efficient as the pilot himself knows when to pull up and observe the fall off shot. You see, one of the procedures we had is that when you told the guns to fire, they gave you the time of the flight of the shell and then they’d give you a standby five seconds before the shell would land, so you could be right on the ground--then you’d just lean back on the stick. Well, if that command went to an observer, by the time he tells the pilot -- I mean, there’s a disconnect there. So that basically, yes, we had no one in the back seat. And I’m not so sure--various marks of Austers--whether there was any room at all, although they did have twin seats. But basically, the observer thing was very new—it was post-war, really.

INTERVIEWER: Tell me something about flight safety and ground safety around aircraft, flight safety in the air--that sort of thing—and what sort of training you received in that area.

HEITSHU: Well, it’s an interesting question because when I was with the Air OP Flight, we had RCAF personnel, as I said earlier on--our riggers and fitters -- and we in theory, in Petawawa, at any event—well, not in theory—but for flying purposes, belonged to RCAF Station Rockcliffe, but for our role as Air OP, and the fact that we were in the Army, on base, Camp Petawawa. So, at one stage of the game, I must admit that the flight safety was lax, in that nobody knew who owned us, really, when it came to enacting flight safety. The Division didn’t care. Rockcliffe was a distance away, and we were these people who came in from time to time from Petawawa to have the airplane fixed.

So, that I must admit that there was a general consciousness of safety in the troop, or in the Flight, but I can’t even recall if there was any one who was officially the Flight Safety Officer, although I’m sure there must have been. And a lot of the safety, then—there were two aspects of it. One was that there was ground safety, because the airfield at the time-- Silver Dart Airfield--was located right next to an ammunition depot. Approaches were not too good, and people didn’t realize that airplanes were landing on this old field, so we wanted to make sure the vehicles didn’t cross the runway. When we refueled, we had a flagpole that people didn’t run in it. All the things that would have been sorted out on an RCAF airfield, but we were just getting started.

The other thing was that very often the comment would come that “How come the Air OP are flying and other people aren’t flying?” And we got to the point to say, “We’ll fly anywhere, anytime.” It was really a bit of a lax attitude, I would think, because as it turned out that because of the access we did subsequently get, a lot of it was because we were flying in conditions that we shouldn’t have been flying in. I think even though we had to do instrument flying, it was a pretty primitive arrangement of putting a yellow, plastic curtain in the aircraft, and having a fellow pilot watching you from the back seat. We were never checked out, although on one occasion, someone came down from Rivers, to check us out in general.

So, basically, when unification came—when I was commanding 4 Air OP troop in Petawawa, one of my pilots, flying an L-19-L in fact, crashed outside of Borden, and burned. The

subsequent investigation was conducted by the Directorate of Flight Safety. And interestingly enough, Major Mike Henderson, an ex-Air OP, was working for that board. And I suppose it ended up as pilot error, but basically, I don't think that the officer in question was able to react quickly enough to a very violent snowstorm between Borden and Holland Marsh, which you know is a snow belt in that area. And, from then on, things tightened up. But really, that's one plus for unification. No. People will always say that in times of emergency or wartime, it would have to be loosened up. In other words, flight safety was merely sensible flying—I mean, behaving. But an official program...

Just like, in fact, when I was commanding the Brigade, we took this from the Air Force—having a General Safety Officer, who would report to the Brigade Commander, because when I got to Valcartier—not just because it was Valcartier—you had a flight safety person. You had vehicle safety. You had fire safety. You had about six kinds of safety officers on the base, and all doing their little thing. And they couldn't all have access to the Commander, so a General Safety Officer. Besides, I think safety, as a subject, has more meaning now than in those days, in all walks of life.

INTERVIEWER: Yes. As I recall, the Army tended to look after things, in an Army way. And the safety had not been inculcated as such.

I'd like to talk about discipline now, and any differences in discipline, let's say, within the Air OP and the rest of the Regiment. I'd like to ask now if you'd describe the relationship of Air OP officers with other officers, and how did discipline work within the Air OP troop?

HEITSHU: Well actually, until unification, generally speaking, the discipline--whether it be dress or conduct--was very similar—well, in fact, the same as in the Regiment. In fact, often the Air OP troop was stationed cheek by jowl to a Regiment and sharing the same mess. And dress was the same. When we were separate, like at Divisional Headquarters, occasionally people would say, "Well, you people at Div...." But that's just a normal reaction to people who were at Superior Headquarters. But still we dressed the same way. And in fact, this brings up a point.

In those days, believe it or not, when we went flying, we went flying properly dressed—boots, putties, 37 Pattern web belt, the four inch cap on—and all we were doing is jumping into an airplane instead of into a jeep. The joke was that, you know, you had no hair on your leg because of the rudder pedals going through your battle dress, or whatever it was. And, your hat was a bit creased because of the headsets. To the point that, ultimately, as we got more attention, from not only the Air Force, but as we were trying to cope to conditions other than in Europe. For example, we would fly to Borden in the winter, just in our battle dress. And someone said that we should get a proper flying suit, etc.

So as this came about, there became a bit of a problem, not so much between officers, but between the senior officers who would say, "Why do you people dress differently?" And I remember, in Gagetown, somebody walking--going to an O Group in his flying suit and getting properly ticked off, because this wasn't the dress of the day. Somehow it was about the only real problem. But to come back to flying properly dressed, one of the things that ultimately took place was the need-- going back to safety--to have proper headgear. And that's when we got the "chrome dome", as we called it. At first we were all saying, "Well, it

will limit our vision.” But obviously it didn’t. So that’s when the safety aspect comes into it, in that we dressed for the part now.

But basically, we tried to maintain the same spirit and traditions that the Artillery had. In other words, when our regimental parades, I always had a parade in the morning. It was just like the battery did. Even in Gagetown, the airmen would parade, and they didn’t mind. Basically, this was done intentionally, in a way, that we weren’t that different. We were just doing an Artillery role that required airplanes. I’m proud of the fact that we were first, gunners, and next, (technical?) airmen.

INTERVIEWER: I’d to ask you one final question. As you look back over your flying career in the Canadian Army and the Canadian Armed Forces, what would you describe as your most memorable experience?

HEITSHU: Well, there are two of them. One is a good one. One is a bad one, I suppose. I was in Gagetown during a divisional concentration, and there was a big exercise going on and the CRA was there and the Divisional Commander was at the OP. The Chief of Personnel, from Ottawa, was down for this exercise. Anyway, to make a long story short, they declared a divisional target, and I was the one set up to engage it. And I guess I just felt good that day, and maybe a bit cocky. It was ranging in divisional artillery, you know, three regiments worth of guns, and it was a bunch of wrecks on a hill. And in the Artillery, when you say “concentrate”, it’s a chancy thing, because if you over concentrate, and you miss the target, the shells instead of braining(?) the target will all go to one side, or what have you. So I did a half concentrate and fire for effect. I obliterated the top of the hill and all the vehicles that were on it, with all of the brass to see, which was a real ego trip. But which really pointed out that one airplane could engage very many guns and do severe damage to whatever it is they were trying to knock out.

The other experience, which is never below me, in that it could have been very serious, is after coming back doing a crater analysis mission in Shilo, with three other pilots. No, in fact, I was with just two other airplanes with 1 Air OP Flight. We decided on the way back to the strip to do some formation flying. In those days, for whatever reason, they weren’t using radio communications when they were (met?)—they were using hand signals. Charlie Panning (?) was lead aircraft. I was starboard right, and we decided we would do sort of a fighter break over the Raptor Field, now known as Lou Gluten(?) field. He gave the hand signal and I reacted too quickly, and my left wing got into the horn of his tail, and he went straight down pulling on his stick and barely cleared the deck.

I sort of realized that something had gone wrong, so I turned and banked slowly to the left. And then Bill Pollock, the other pilot, came next to me, waving his hand and pointing. I looked and a third of my wing was flapping down, and then, I did the widest turn ever seen, around the base, and landed. Anyways, there was a close call. The interesting thing here is that the Flight Commander was very sort of forgiving, and basically, it was an accident. When they sent for a replacement wing, the Ross computer system wasn’t fully up to speed, I guess, because they got a Dakota wing to replace the L-19 wing.

But other experiences were any successful mission. And I suppose this photo business always sticks in my mind because in fact one of the things that precipitated all this—it’s an interesting aside, I guess. You’ve heard of the Land Camera—well, that was developed by a

Dr. Land. When we tested it in Gagetown one year, and in those days it was just like an ordinary camera with a long lens. We flew over an OP with General Rockingham looking onto a bunch of vehicles out there, took a picture, and then flew low level behind the place, and one minute later, a developed picture we threw down in a sandbag for all to see. So that was when the Polaroid camera came out. And there was a Black Watch Major who was shown this picture, and he said in his Scottish brogue, "It's the work of the devil." But I subsequently met a lady in Florida, who actually was the secretary of Dr. Land in New York, and she said he would have liked to have heard that story. That's what got us going on this photo business. That was before TV and battlefield surveillance and that sort of stuff.

INTERVIEWER: Any final words for any researchers that might be listening to this tape in some years in the future, about the beginnings and the operation of Army aviation in the Canadian Army and Canadian Forces?

HEITSHU: Well, when I look back on my career in the Forces--in the Army in particular--in this case including flying--the thing that continuously impressed me is the fact that we develop new technologies, faster means of gathering information, all to the final aim of winning the battle or completing the mission. And at the end of every successful operation, I find that what made the thing work is having the soldiers—the troops on the ground—knowing what their mission was—who make it all happen. It's a team effort, but we mustn't forget that it's not one specific technology or weapon that wins the war, but leadership and....

[Canadian War Museum Oral History Program Interview with General Bob Heitshu. End of Tape 1, Side 2.]

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